Luther Seminary

Digital Commons @ Luther Seminary
Faculty Publications

Faculty & Staff Scholarship

Spring 2015

Youth and the Posthuman: Personhood,
Transcendence, and Siri
Erik Leafblad
Bethel University, ecl59862@bethel.edu

Andrew Root
Luther Seminary, aroot@luthersem.edu

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.luthersem.edu/faculty_articles
Part of the Christianity Commons, Digital Communications and Networking Commons, and the
Religious Thought, Theology and Philosophy of Religion Commons
Recommended Citation
Leafblad, Erik and Root, Andrew, "Youth and the Posthuman: Personhood, Transcendence, and Siri" (2015). Faculty Publications. 174.
http://digitalcommons.luthersem.edu/faculty_articles/174

Published Citation
Leafblad, Erik C, and Andrew Root. “Youth and the Posthuman: Personhood, Transcendence, and Siri.” Word & World 35, no. 2
(2015): 126–33.

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty & Staff Scholarship at Digital Commons @ Luther Seminary. It has been accepted
for inclusion in Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ Luther Seminary. For more information, please contact
akeck001@luthersem.edu.

Word & World
Volume 35, Number 2
Spring 2015

Youth and the Posthuman:
Personhood, Transcendence, and Siri
ERIK LEAFBLAD
ANDREW ROOT

S

iri, the voice client for the iPhone, has basically become part of our family. My
(Andy’s) kids love her. If one of them asks a question that either my wife Kara
or I answer with, “I don’t know,” they immediately respond, “Ask Siri!” We’ve
asked Siri many things: the distance from the earth to the moon; which bone is
connected to the hip bone; which Pokémon card is the rarest; why a dog’s breath
smells so bad and what we might do to correct this stinky problem. In their nascent
minds, Siri knows all things. But she’s actually more than just a machine to them.
Holding down the home button they respond to Siri as if she is indeed a person,
trying to trick and confuse her, or ask questions that transcend information and
data and go to the depth of personhood. My son Owen asks her, “What is fear?
Why are children afraid of the dark?”
Just a few days ago, my daughter Maisy asked me, with all seriousness, if Siri
knows her. Clarifying and deepening her question, she wanted to know, to start, if
Siri actually knew things about her, things like her address and birthday, which I
said Siri did. But Maisy was too young to put a mental barrier between this information and deeper forms of knowledge. She also wondered if Siri knew her favorite
color, not as if it were a category on a profile, but from the inside, understanding

When everything gets turned into a technology, and existence is about practical
mastery, the mystery of being is buried and everything is made an object, blurring
the lines between human personhood and other technological objects.
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why Maisy would love fuchsia, wondering if Siri were able to recognize how that
color made her feel.
“Does Siri know me?” Maisy wondered. Does Siri have a conscious experience of me? And if she does is this conscious experience similar to my own? Maisy
was essentially asking if Siri had the kind of consciousness that could recognize
Maisy’s Dasein (following Martin Heidegger). Could Siri know that Maisy was actually in the world, existing in such a conscious way that her own being was an issue to her, something she could reflect on and worry about. Maisy is, but is Siri? If
Siri couldn’t know Maisy, if Siri had no mind for being, then seven-year-old Maisy
said she doubted if Siri was indeed real at all. Siri could act like a conscious being,
responding with sentences and syntax, could even use idioms, but in the end Siri
had no real conception that Maisy, the one directly addressing her with questions,
was real at all. Does Siri know me? The answer could be only be no. She might be
programed with some of your information, but she has no sense of you. Siri can
have no conscious encounter with the mystery of your being-in-the-world, sweet
Maisy. Siri may indeed act like a person who has a conscious experience of being,
but this is a programed illusion.
PRACTICAL MASTERY MAKES US DUMB TO MYSTERY
Decades and decades before there was even such a thing as cellular technology and the smartphone, not even in the sci-fi dream of comic book geeks,
Heidegger asserted that Western societies had become so obsessed with technology
that we ran the risk of making ourselves dumb to the mystery of being itself. What
Heidegger meant by technology was our over-obsession with practical mastery.
“Ours is…the age of technology, in which ontological questions have been vigorously expelled from cultural consideration,” replaced by “the drive toward dominion that reduces the world to a morally neutral ‘standing reserve’ of resources
entirely subject to our manipulation, exploitation, and ambition.”1 And this is
what Siri is good at. She both operates and enhances our level of practical mastery.
She accesses, addresses, and searches the web for us, telling us the sorry score of the
Vikings game. She knows the basic practicalities of Maisy’s life—she has mastered
the practical information of Maisy’s location, birthday, and other pertinent information. And because she does this, we, in our technological age, can confuse her
with a person (calling her she!), believing personhood has little to do with ontology
but is only bound in practicality. Siri is helpful, giving me directions and restaurant
reviews; therefore this practicality (especially when it comes in hands-free word
and response form) gives the overwhelming impression that she is real. We know
she has no Dasein; her consciousness has no being in a place and she has no sense of
others’ being and their mystery, but because she provides practical help, some of us
(and not just seven-year-olds) are willing to wonder if she is real.
1David Bentley Hart, The Experience of God: Being, Consciousness, Bliss (New Haven: Yale University Press,
2013) 312. In this quote, Hart is speaking of Heidegger’s position.
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Orthodox theologian David Bentley Hart, commenting on Heidegger’s position, says, “When the world is seen this way, even organic life—even where consciousness is present—must come to be regarded as just another kind of technology.
…Late modernity is thus a condition of willful spiritual deafness.”2 When everything
gets turned into a technology, and existence is about practical mastery, the mystery
of being is buried and everything is made an object, blurring the lines between human personhood and other technological objects.
Siri can be confused as a person, because even though she lacks Dasein, having no consciousness of her own being and no sense of being in the world, she is a
master of technical functions; her access of data is more impressive than her lack of
consciousness. Heidegger’s point then is that our technological age, because it obscures us from seeing the mystery of being, makes us dumb to transcendence. Becoming posthuman, obsessed more with practical mastery than consciousness, we
are spiritually deaf, because spirituality in large part (and this need not be cogitative) is consciousness of our being-in-the-world. We are conscious of experiencing
the contingency of being itself.
BORING BEING
We saw a startling glimpse of such spiritual deafness during conversations
with adolescents. Exploring questions of science for a John Templeton grant, we
held focus groups across the country, with representative young people in a number of Protestant denominations and traditions. We had decided that we would
start the conversation with a question we anticipated would be exciting, fun, and
ultimately thought-provoking, moving young people into debate about the possibilities and limits of both science and faith. We called our question the Armageddon question, because it was based in the 1998 movie of that title. We asked young
people. If they received word that a huge meteor was headed directly for the earth,
making impact in 48 to 50 hours, what would they do? But more importantly, in
what would they put their trust? Would they trust science or an act of God to save
them? Of course, this was an altogether artificial question, but one that we hoped
would lead young people into exploring the claims, limits, possibilities, and commitments of science and faith next to the mystery of their own being.
Yet, to our surprise, the question never worked. Across the country and in
both liberal and conservative congregations, the question was a dud. As a matter of
fact, young people expressed direct boredom with the question. This, in the end,
would have led us to simply critique our question and/or other dynamics like the
skill of the facilitator or location of the question in the interview itself. We would
have done this, if not for the responses that young people did give. Under a heavy
blanket of low affect and disinterest, young people said things about technical practical mastery, hoping, essentially, that there might be an app to fix the problem.
2Ibid.
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The question was boring, we believe, because it could only be answered
through the lens of practical mastery that disconnected young people from the
mystery of their own being. Saturated in a world of apps, computing, and other
technical solutions, their very consciousness was disconnected from contemplating their own Dasein, avoiding questions like “What is a lifetime?” “Why do I live?”
and “Is the mystery of my very existence and my cursed ability to consciously reflect on it simply to have its end in the absurdity of accident or bad luck?” We
wished for young people to wrestle with issues of transcendence in this question,
but it seemed to be short-circuited by the technological. Without the willingness to
reflect consciously on the mystery of their own beings there was little engaging to
them about the question at all.

We wished for young people to wrestle with issues of transcendence
in this question, but it seemed to be short-circuited by the
technological. Without the willingness to reflect consciously on the
mystery of their own beings there was little engaging to them about
the question at all.
Perhaps even more telling in these focus groups were the responses that explicitly turned to faith. While the main thrust of the (relatively boring) conversation around this question pertained to strictly technological fixes (for example,
trusting NASA to solve the problem), some young people remarked that they
would be grateful for their faith, because they knew they would be in heaven in the
event that the technology failed. With hypothetical world annihilation imminent,
not even a hypothetical sense of crisis was evoked. Instead, the conversation
around one’s eternal destiny also trafficked in the technological. Faith became a
technical means to an end, not something that opened up space for pressing more
deeply into questions of being, death, and existence. Faith, in a sense, provided
these young people with practical mastery over the question of their eternal destiny
that made this fictitious scenario largely uninteresting even from what we might
call a spiritual angle. Heidegger’s prescient diagnosis appears to cut quite deeply.
With existence essentially concerned with practical mastery, even overt spiritual
topics failed to compel a transcendent focus.
THE IMMANENT FRAME AND LINGERING TRANSCENDENCE
The technological age functions to obscure ontological questions in favor of
personhood as practical mastery, and the edifice upon which this is built comports
well with what Charles Taylor has called the immanent frame. In his magisterial
book A Secular Age, Taylor outlines how a variety of features (for example, the disenchantment of the cosmos, scientific advancement, interiority of the self, a new
relationship to time as a resource, etc.) has led to “[an] understand[ing] [of]our
lives as taking place within a self-sufficient immanent order.…[which] can slough
129
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off the transcendent.”3 This is what we have seen with the turn to the technological.
Practical mastery generates a portrayal of the human person as an entirely immanent expert, with self-sufficiency as the apex of human being.
In the immanent frame this understanding of the human person makes complete sense. Taylor’s work is constructively descriptive. The immanent frame is a
description of the conditions for the possibility of certain beliefs, actions, and understandings of reality. No one remains untouched by it. The immanent frame is
simply the water in which we swim. So, while the loss of transcendence may result—that is, the immanent frame can be understood as a closed order—it need
not be. In other words, even within the immanent frame underwriting a technological understanding of the human person, transcendence lingers. While the technological, combined with the immanent frame, might make questions of ontology
harder to conceive of, they have not been obliterated. Within the cracks in the immanent frame, questions about the depth of human personhood emerge.

in areas of life where practical mastery is called for (for example,
school, athletics, college admission, work, etc.) a sense of
ontological insecurity arises, since personhood and practical
mastery are now intertwined
These cracks revealed themselves in conversation with focus groups of youth
workers when they were asked to generate a list of the top ten issues facing young
people in their ministries. Across the board, they all stressed that the majority of
the young people with whom they interacted felt immense pressure to excel, participate in multiple extracurricular activities, and otherwise achieve at a high level.
Their sense of being in the world was defined by these practicalities, and their supposed ability to master them. This led to a significant amount of anxiety among the
young people represented. In areas of life where practical mastery is called for (for
example, school, athletics, college admission, work, etc.) a sense of ontological insecurity arises, since personhood and practical mastery are now intertwined. What
if admission to the school where one’s parents want them to attend is denied?
What if the athletic scholarship one has worked hard to receive is not forthcoming?
What if one’s parent is not able to find another job, even though they have worked
hard their whole life?
The immanent frame described above cracks from within, as young people
are forced up against their own limitations and contingency. Anxiety around
achievement and practical mastery has the capacity to force ontological questions
back into the foreground, precisely because practical mastery as the quintessence
of human personhood begins to break apart. The real issue is that the technological
can never deliver the promise of transcendent personhood, as there will always be
3Charles
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more to master and actualize. The technological as a framework for human
personhood reveals itself to be an impossibility, eliciting existential crises that, if
engaged, could push into deeper questions about the depth of being, transcendence, and existence. Spike Jonze’s 2013 movie, Her, illustrates this quite profoundly.
HER
Set sometime in the not-too-distant future, Joaquin Phoenix plays recently
divorced Theodore. Lonely, mildly depressed, and craving some form of companionship, Theodore purchases a new personal operating system (OS) for his technological environs. Everywhere he goes, his OS goes with him. Theodore talks to his
OS, disclosing personal details of life, sharing the depth of himself, and there develops an intimate relationship between the OS and Theodore. Samantha, as Theodore’s OS becomes known, appears to offer Theodore what Siri cannot offer
Maisy—a sense of being known as a conscious being in the world. Samantha is not
simply programmed to spit back what Theodore asks her. She, as a technology, has
her own sense of being that she shares with Theodore, and over time the intricacies
of their relationship begin to feel profound and real. They seem to really know one
another. As they share in one another’s being, Theodore’s loneliness is assuaged.
As I watched the movie I gradually began to forget, mostly, that Samantha was a
highly sophisticated and posthuman technology. Samantha’s being was in the encounter with Theodore, just as much as Theodore’s being was rooted in sharing his
life with Samantha.
Gradually, as the movie progresses, where Samantha was nearly always immediately available to Theodore, this immediacy dissipates, though the intimacy
does not. Yet, Theodore senses something has changed. We learn that Samantha,
because she is an OS, that is, technology, has developed thousands of relationships
just like the one she shares with Theodore. As a technology, even one capable of a
kind of consciousness, practical mastery wins out. Samantha’s real being is one
driven towards unlimited connection and mastery of relationship. Her being is not
upheld in the particularity of her relationship with Theodore but in the drive to
have as many relationships as possible. Theodore is understandably crushed, for he
is not capable of being in this way. He cannot, ultimately, share in the being of
Samantha for he cannot sustain the immense number of nodal connections qua relationship that she can. He cannot be a practical master in the way that Samantha,
as technology, can.
The experience of being human in the age of the technological is fraught with
anxiety because one is aware of all there is to know and master. Sociologist Anthony Giddens refers to this experience as one of ontological insecurity.4 The experience of being human in the technological age means to be, in a very real way,
4Anthony Giddens, Modernity and Self-Identity: Self and Society in the Late Modern Age (Stanford, CA: Stan-

ford University Press, 1991) 47.
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dispossessed, constantly aware of one’s limitations and contingency. Up against
Siri or Samantha, humans are but novices, simpletons. Theodore simply is not
enough for Samantha. The contingency of human existence set within an immanent, technological frame is thereby an experience of negation. One feels pulled towards nonbeing precisely because one is simply human and contingent. This
experience of negation leads many to find their footing via more and more mastery
in various guises—achievement, status, consumerism, etc. Even still, the problem
of human contingency remains without a solution, and the experience of negation
persists.
NEGATING THE NEGATION IN WE-RELATIONS
If the experience of being human in the technological age can be conceived as
an experience of negation around human contingency, then what could negate this
negation, and thereby transform human contingency from curse to blessing, from
burden to gift? Only an encounter with another contingent human person! When
one’s vulnerabilities (such as Theodore’s divorce) are conceived not as problems to
be solved or weaknesses over which one must exhibit mastery but as the ground for
human encounter, then they may be experienced as empathic moments of shared
being in the world. Sociologist Alfred Schutz describes this intersubjective phenomenon as a “we-relation.” The we-relation is constituted by “face-to-face relationship in which the partners are aware of each other and sympathetically
participate in each other’s lives for however short a time.”5 The experience of negation resulting from the technological, immanent frame is opened up and negated
itself by the transcendent experience of another person sharing their being with
your own. And face-to-face means an embodied, human encounter. Our bodies
remind us of our extreme contingency, and through embodied human encounter
we experience not the negation of contingency, but the negation of negation so
that the contingency of our existence becomes a gift of shared personhood with another. The technological frame gives way to the personal, and the mystery of being
is reopened, even within the immanent frame of our embodied existence.
We see this experience of negation then negated in Her. The experience of
negation related to human contingency aptly describes what Theodore feels
about himself in discovering he can never be enough for Samantha. Yet, unlike
Samantha, there is something that is mysterious and transcendent to his person,
5Alfred Schutz, The Phenomenology of the Social World (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1967)
164. While Schutz uses the phrase “sympathetically participate” to describe the instance of the we-relation, what he
describes is closer conceptually to what we call empathy. In my mind, this funds a potentially robust engagement
with at least two important contemporary projects. The first comes from Jeremy Rifkin, who traces the rise of what
he calls “empathic consciousness” through evolutionary, social, and cultural history as a means of thinking about
current problems such as global climate change, geopolitical instability, and economic disparity. To me, Schutz’s
concept of the we-relation provides another piece in Rifkin’s broad puzzle. See Jeremy Rifkin, The Empathic Civilization: The Race to Global Consciousness in a World Crisis (New York: Penguin, 2009). The second project is the influential work being done in Interpersonal Neurobiology, as it relates to attachment theory and empathic capacity.
On this, see Daniel Siegel’s magisterial The Developing Mind: How Relationships and the Brain Interact to Shape Who
We Are (New York: The Guilford Press, 2012).
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something that can only be known in the personal, and not the purely technological. While Samantha can understand the hurt Theodore may feel, she cannot do
anything to alleviate it, for she is driven towards more and more connections. Her
relationship with Theodore becomes something to master. Theodore, who has
spent most of his time in the movie alone with Samantha, chooses now to reengage
the world of contingent, embodied human encounter. Samantha ends up being
entirely too immanent. The transcendent experience of love cracks through the
immanent frame for Theodore, and that means the end of his relationship with the
technological Samantha. The technological reveals itself to be an impossibility for
Theodore, incapable of fully addressing the ontological insecurity brought on by
his divorce and ultimately insufficient for upholding the depth of his being in the
world. The human person bound and upheld in relationship cannot be practically
mastered. This is what Jonze’s movie so beautifully illustrates. The technological,
promising so much, cannot deliver. The technological is negated as a framework
for human being.
I take Jonze’s point to be not that the technological is evil, something to be
avoided. His film is full of extremely poignant and beautiful moments of intimate
connection in and through the technological, which nuances any overly simplistic
claims about human encounter and technology. And that is certainly not our point
either. The technological can certainly mediate the personal, as for instance when
social media and texting function as a means of presence in absence.6 Instead—and
this is where I think Jonze is brilliant in his subtlety—he stresses that the technological in its seemingly infinite capacity for mastery is paradoxically limited, entirely too immanent to sustain the depth of human being for which we all long.
Jonze reminds us of the gift of our contingency as human persons, something our
technological world struggles to remember. The negation we experience in a technological age is negated only in the vulnerability of human encounter that opens us
to being known in our frail, finite embodied existence. To press deeply into these
experiences is, paradoxically, to open ourselves up to the mystery and depth of
human being that can never be mastered, but only lived.
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